711.3 Tolling of time to file complaint; equitable estoppel and discovery rule

The fact that the Complainant filed a timely complaint with the New York Division of Human Rights did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations. Although the Complainant contended that he was told by the NY agency that two agencies could not investigate at once, he was not told he could not file a claim with the ERD or that the statute of limitations would be tolled during its investigation. Rhyne v. Resource Marketing Corp. (LIRC, 03/30/23).

A complainant’s allegation that he first became aware of evidence of possible disparate treatment two years after his separation from employment was rejected where the Complainant had information available to him at the time of discharge that would have warranted a suspicion that he was being discriminated against; the Complainant believed he had done nothing to justify the discharge, contended he had told the Respondent he intended to file a wage claim, and indicated that his supervisor had stated a preference for hiring females. Nickel v. City of Milwaukee (LIRC, 09/29/23).

The Complainant argued that his complaint was filed late because he was unaware of the existence of the ERD. However, the Complainant attempted to file his complaint at other agencies, including the Illinois Department of Human Rights, the Federal Rail Association, and the Amtrak Office of Inspector General. He was therefore clearly aware of his right to be free from discrimination and it was incumbent upon him to educate himself regarding the procedures for filing a WPAAL complaint. Sellars v. Nat. Railroad Passenger Corp. (LIRC, 12/22/23). NOTE: This case has been appealed to circuit court.

Fear of retaliation is not a basis for tolling the statute of limitations. The WFEA specifically prohibits retaliation and provides a cause of action if retaliation occurs. Further, in this case the Complainant had already lost her job and would have no reason to fear retaliation. Ohren v. Ascension Health Alliance (LIRC, 12/29/21).

Equitable tolling based on a claim of depression was not justified where the Complainant submitted no medical evidence indicating that her condition was disabling and where she was able to perform other tasks including starting a new job and pursuing an internal grievance related to her discharge during the limitations period. Pospychala v. Pine Crest Nursing Home (LIRC, 09/17/21).

The statute of limitations began to run when the Complainant learned he was denied a job, even though he was not specifically informed of the age, sex or race of the individual hired instead. Only a month earlier, the Complainant had filed a separate complaint against the same employer alleging an ongoing and systematic failure to hire him for multiple jobs due to discriminatory reasons. Consequently, the Complainant had reason to suspect that discrimination occurred even before he received specific details about the successful candidate and should have acted to preserve his rights. Shore v. Univ. of Wis. Madison (LIRC, 02/12/21).

The Complainant’s argument for equitable tolling based upon her disability fails where she was able to contact the Equal Rights Division during the limitations period, was represented by counsel during at least some of that time, and filed a timely appeal of a determination in another matter. Ostopowicz v. United Healthcare (LIRC, 03/30/20).

The Complainant filed a timely charge with the Milwaukee office of the EEOC regarding alleged discrimination in November 2014. The EEOC designated “St. Louis Civil Rights Enforcement” as the local fair employment agency and transferred the case to the St. Louis District Office of the EEOC. Two and one-half years later the Complainant filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division making the same allegations as in the EEOC charge filed in 2014. The Equal Rights Division complaint was untimely. Equitable tolling does not apply to allow the filing date of the EEOC charge to serve as the filing date of the Wisconsin Equal Rights Division complaint. Since the Equal Rights Division was not the designated local fair employment practice agency on the EEOC charge, and it had no knowledge of the charge at the time it was filed, there is no basis for finding error on the part of the Equal Rights Division as a cause for the late filing. Broughton v. Express Scripts Inc. (LIRC, 05/30/18).

Equitable tolling may be appropriate when a Complainant’s failure to comply with the statute of limitations is attributable to his or her medical condition, but only if it is established through medical evidence that because of the condition the Complainant was entirely incapable of bringing a legal action, and it must be shown that the incapacity lasted essentially throughout the filing period, leaving the Complainant unable, during any periods of capacity, to file a timely complaint. Here, the Complainant’s vague and conclusory statements, without description of how a medical condition adversely affected his capacity to function, are not sufficient to support equitable tolling. Equitable tolling may also be appropriate when the untimeliness of a complaint was due to agency error, but here the Complainant’s reference to making contact with someone at the Equal Rights Division and to his thought that the employee told him he had a year to file a complaint is too vague to support equitable tolling. Van Derel v. Kettle Moraine Hardwoods (LIRC, 04/30/15).

A claim of mental disability may be sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations, but only if it is established by medical evidence that the individual was entirely incapable of bringing legal action or discovering vital information in support of his claim, because of the disability. Here, evidence of the eligibility for Social Security disability, along with the Complainant’s own statement that a mental condition was the basis for eligibility, is not enough to allow tolling. Material in the case file shows the Complainant was aware of his rights, maintained an ability to respond to requests for information, and meet other deadlines for pursuing this matter. Johnson v. BRP US, Inc. (LIRC, 04/11/14).

Application of equitable estoppel should be premised on a showing of the Complainant’s actual and reasonable reliance on the Respondent’s conduct or representations, and evidence of improper purpose on the part of the Respondent, or of the Respondent’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct. In this case, it was unreasonable for the Complainant to rely on comments by the Respondent, which were not deceptive in nature. Therefore, there was no basis for tolling the statute of limitations. Dieter v. Richland Ctr. Foundry (LIRC, 07/24/12).

The complaint in this matter was filed 323 days after the Complainant was discharged by the Respondent. The Equal Rights Division dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. On appeal, the Labor and Industry Review Commission determined that due process required that the Complainant be provided an opportunity for a hearing at which she could attempt to prove that it was only after some time had passed without her being rehired (while others were rehired) that the Complainant began to realize that the Respondent did not have any intention of reinstating her employment. Dykstra v. Rhodes Int’l (LIRC, 03/29/12).

The complaint in this case was not timely filed and there was no basis for tolling the statute of limitations. The Complainant submitted statements that she has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder; however, the documentation she provided did not establish that she was entirely incapable of bringing a legal action or discovering the information needed for her claim. The fact that the Complainant did ultimately get her complaint filed, and that she understood the effect of the statute of limitations when she found out about it, show that her condition was not something that made her entirely incapable of acting on her rights within the statute of limitations period. Kiefer v. Caring Alternatives (LIRC, 04/29/11).

The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act does not recognize ignorance of one’s rights as a basis for overlooking the statute of limitations. The law expects that individuals will show a reasonably prudent regard for their rights. Kiefer v. Caring Alternatives (LIRC, 04/29/11).

In order for a Complainant to invoke equitable estoppel there must be evidence that the Respondent took active steps to prevent the timely filing of a complaint, such as hiding evidence or promising not to plead the statute of limitations. In this case, the Respondent’s alleged promise to look into the Complainant’s disagreement with the reasons for his termination did not include any requests that he not file a complaint. Nor did the Respondent give the Complainant any indication that any investigation it did could result in the reversal of its decision to terminate his employment. The Respondent did not do anything that would warrant the tolling of the statute of limitations in this case. Parker v. Tri-County Mem’l Hosp. (LIRC, 03/25/11).

Equitable estoppel comes into play if the Respondent took active steps to prevent the Complainant from filing a complaint in time, such as by hiding evidence or promising not to plead the statute of limitations. Among other things, the granting of equitable estoppel should be premised upon: (1) a showing of the Complainant’s actual and reasonable reliance on the Respondent’s conduct or representations, and (2) evidence of improper purpose on the part of the Respondent, or of the Respondent’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct. Equitable tolling comes into play where a Complainant is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim due to wrongdoing by the Respondent. The Complainant in this case did not establish any wrongdoing by the Respondent. Schulke v. Mills Fleet Farm (LIRC, 06/04/10).

Equitable tolling may apply when the untimeliness of the complaint was due to errors by the Equal Rights Division. The Complainant in this case did not establish that the Equal Rights Division had misled the Complainant in any way. Schulke v. Mills Fleet Farm (LIRC, 06/04/10).

Equitable tolling may be appropriate where the Complainant’s failure to comply with the statute of limitations is attributable to the Complainant’s medical condition. However, equitable tolling is not appropriate where the Complainant has made only a vague claim, without a particularized description of how his condition adversely affected his capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of his rights. In this case, the Complainant did not state when he was diagnosed with cancer; nor did he submit any medical information regarding his diagnosis of cancer and how it might have affected his capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of his rights. Schulke v. Mills Fleet Farm (LIRC, 06/04/10).

The Complainant asserted that he has a disability of “mental retardation.” Mental incapacity might be sufficient to toll the filing period, but only if the individual was entirely incapable of filing the legal action or discovering the vital information for the claim. The Complainant did not affirmatively assert that his mental condition prevented him from timely filing a complaint against his employer. Nor did he submit any medical evidence which would support a showing that his mental condition was so disabling that it rendered him incapable of filing a timely complaint. Brantner v. Goodwill Indus. (LIRC, 02/19/10).

A limited period of incapacity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations indefinitely. In this case, even if the statute of limitations were to be tolled for the 51 days during which the Complainant’s psychiatrist contended he was incapacitated during the limitations period, there was nothing to indicate that the Complainant had been too impaired to understand or act on his legal rights during the first 249 days of the 300-day filing period. Albino v. Iglesia Metodista Unida Cristo En Tu Ayuda (LIRC, 07/25/08).

The “discovery rule” is read into the statute of limitations and postpones the beginning of the limitations period from the date the Complainant was wronged to the date when the Complainant discovered that he or she has been injured. The limitations period does not begin to run until the facts that would support a charge of discrimination were apparent, or should have been apparent, to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his or her rights. Williams v. Four Points Sheraton Hotel (LIRC, 03/21/08).

While mental incompetence has sometimes been found to be a justifiable basis for tolling the statute of limitations, there was nothing in this case which supported tolling the statute of limitations on that basis. The Complainant failed to affirmatively assert that her depression did, in fact, cause her to miscalculate the filing deadline. Further, the Complainant did not submit any medical evidence which would support a showing that her condition was so disabling that it rendered her incapable of filing a complaint of discrimination throughout the 300-day charge-filing period. Berg v. Agape of Appleton (LIRC, 09/22/06).

During the 300-day filing period, the Complainant sent a letter to the Respondent in an attempt to avoid termination. The Complainant did not send his letter to the Equal Rights Division or to any other authorized agency. The Complainant later argued that the Respondent’s failure to forward his letter to the Equal Rights Division constituted fraud and that the Respondent should be estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense to the complaint he filed after the 300-day filing period. The Respondent had no duty to serve as the Complainant’s advocate or agent. Moreover, the Complainant did not assert that the Respondent misinformed him about the complaint-filing process or otherwise misled him in regard to this matter. The complaint was appropriately dismissed because it was not timely filed with the Equal Rights Division. Rowry v. Schneider Training Acad. (LIRC, 01/13/06).

The Complainant sent correspondence relating to a consumer complaint filed against the Respondent to the Attorney General of Illinois within the 300-day filing period; however, this did not toll the statute of limitations under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. Illinois does not have a work-sharing agreement with the Equal Rights Division, or any other authority for accepting filings under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, and filing a complaint with a consumer protection agency in another state does not otherwise satisfy the requirements for filing a WFEA complaint with the Equal Rights Division of the State of Wisconsin. Rowry v. Schneider Training Acad. (LIRC, 01/13/06).

The Complainant argued that the filing deadline should be extended because the Respondent denied him access to certain records during the actionable 300-day filing period. This argument was rejected because despite the Respondent’s alleged denial of access to certain records, the Complainant had reason to suspect during the filing period that retaliation may have been a motive for his termination. Welsh v. DOC (LIRC, 01/13/06).

The Complainant unsuccessfully argued that his failure to timely file a complaint should be excused because he was relying upon advice from his union representative in prosecuting his claim. Cramer v. Woodman’s Food Mkt. (LIRC, 01/14/05).

The statute of limitations begins to run when the Complainant receives actual or constructive notice of the allegedly discriminatory adverse employment action, not when the Complainant forms a belief that he was discriminated against when this action was taken. Although a Respondent’s subsequent treatment of similarly situated employees could be relevant to the issue of discrimination, it does not serve to toll the limitations period. The Complainant in this case was aware in December of 2001 that a successor corporation would not be employing him in any capacity. The Complainant’s termination was effective in March of 2002. At that time the Complainant learned that the new corporate entity had selected a younger person for the regional leader position for which he believed he was qualified. Neither the fact that the Complainant may not have formed a belief that he had been discriminated against in regard to his involuntary separation until he learned that a younger person had been selected for the regional leader position, nor the fact that his termination was not effected until March of 2002 would operate to toll the statute of limitations. The operative date for computing the Complainant’s 300-day filing period was the date in December of 2001 when he learned that the new corporate entity would not be employing him. Maynard v. Cummins Npower (LIRC, 01/28/04).

The doctrine of equitable estoppel, also known as “fraudulent concealment,” applies to situations in which the Respondent takes active steps to prevent the Complainant from filing a complaint in time, such as by hiding evidence or promising not to raise the statute of limitations defense. Equitable estoppel is available only if the employee’s untimely filing was the result of a deliberate design by the employer, or actions that the employer should have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge. Among other factors, the granting of equitable estoppel should be premised upon the showing of the employee’s actual and reasonable reliance on the employer’s conduct or representations, and evidence of improper purpose on the part of the employer, or of the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of its conduct. Washington v. United Water Serv. (LIRC, 08/15/03).

Even if it can be found that the Respondent attempted to mislead or misrepresent the facts to a Complainant in order to prevent him from filing a timely complaint, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be applied where the Complainant’s failure to file a timely complaint was not shown to be in reliance on such misrepresentations. Washington v. United Water Serv. (LIRC, 08/15/03).

Although the Complainant’s stroke may have had some adverse effects on her physical and mental capabilities, a Complainant is only entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations when her incapacity reaches such a level that she was incapable of filing a complaint within the requisite time period. The Complainant did not meet this burden. She did not submit any medical evidence, or a statement from her physician, which would support a showing that her condition was so disabling that it rendered her incapable of filing a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Rights Division throughout the 300 day charge-filing period. Wilson v. Doskocil Foods (LIRC, 07/30/03).

The Complainant contended that the filing deadline should be equitably tolled since the Respondent failed to properly respond to open records requests filed by the Complainant after his termination. However, the Complainant had formed the belief that he had been retaliated against by the date of his termination. Since a Complainant need only provide a general statement describing the alleged retaliatory action in the complaint, the Respondent’s failure to provide the requested information did not prevent the Complainant from having adequate information upon which to make his complaint. The Complainant’s dispute with the Respondent relating to his post-termination open records requests did not justify the Complainant’s untimely filing of the complaint. Moeller v. County of Jackson (LIRC, 01/27/03).

A complaint must be filed within 300 days of the date of the alleged discrimination unless a reason exists for the filing deadline to be equitably tolled. A Respondent’s awareness that the Complainant believed that he had been discriminated against, or that the Complainant intended to file a complaint, does not satisfy the test for equitable tolling. The Complainant’s argument that the Respondent in this case could not claim surprise that the Complainant filed a discrimination complaint because the Complainant had previously filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor was rejected. Moeller v. County of Jackson (LIRC, 01/27/03).

The Complainant contended that the Respondent should not be allowed to raise the affirmative defense that the complaint was not timely filed because the Respondent had informed him that it was willing to waive the time limitations. However, the record supports a finding that the Complainant’s supervisor had a good faith belief that she only was waiving the time limits for filing a non-contractual grievance. Further, the Complainant failed to establish that he was justified in relying on his supervisor’s comment as a waiver of the statutory time limit for filing a complaint under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, as opposed to waiver merely of the time limit for filing a non-contractual grievance. Therefore, it was not inequitable to allow the Respondent to invoke the 300-day statute of limitations under the Act. Adam v. DNR (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 12/20/02).

An allegation of negligence on the part of an attorney does not warrant tolling the statute of limitations. Johnsrud v. Prairie du Chien Mem’l Hosp. (LIRC, 06/21/02).

Equitable estoppel is available only if the employee’s otherwise untimely filing was the result of either a deliberate design by the employer, or of actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge. Josellis v. Pace Indus. (LIRC, 06/21/02).

Individuals claiming equitable estoppel against a state agency must show the following elements: (1) That the claiming individual relied, (2) to his detriment, (3) upon an action or inaction by a state agency, (4) that resulted in a serious injury, and (5) the public’s interest would not be unduly harmed by application of estoppel. In this case, a motion to dismiss the complaint on timeliness grounds was dismissed where, accepting what the Complainant said as being true, he established a claim of equitable estoppel where his supervisor stated that she would waive time limits on formal actions and the Complainant relied on this to his detriment because he did not file his complaint within the 300-day time limit. Adam v. DNR (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 02/11/02).

Lack of familiarity with the law does not toll a statutory filing period. Javenkoski v. DOT (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 08/28/00).

Many Complainants are laypersons. Layperson status does not justify extending the statute of limitations. Fester v. Kurt G. Joa, Inc. (LIRC, 08/25/00).

Even if the Complainant could demonstrate that his complaint was late due to negligence on the part of his attorney, this would not justify tolling the statute of limitations. Belli v. Village of Greendale (LIRC, 12/15/98).

The Complainant’s mental illness tolls the statute of limitations only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and, thus, from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them. Osegard v. Wis. Physicians Serv. (LIRC, 08/13/98).

While “excusable ignorance” may toll a statute of limitations, excusable ignorance does not mean ignorance of all the filing periods and technicalities contained in the law, nor does it mean ignorance of specific guidelines such as those issued by the EEOC. Rather, the question to consider is whether the Complainant was generally aware that she had a legal right to be free from discrimination. Gruhle v. Random Lake Sch. Dist. (LIRC, 06/19/98).

The Complainant did not establish a sufficient basis for tolling the statute of limitations where she asserted that she filed the complaint late due to “medical/physical problems.” The Complainant presented no competent medical evidence to show that she was incapable of handling her affairs or comprehending her legal rights during the entire 300 day period following her discharge. Durham v. Emjay Corp. (LIRC, 03/26/97).

The application of the doctrine of equitable tolling was not warranted where the Complainant alleged that he was misled by his attorney into believing that he had waived his right to file a fair employment claim by collecting unemployment compensation benefits. Gartmann v. Ideal Door Co. (LIRC, 07/03/96).

Employees are required to exercise reasonable diligence by requesting an explanation for unfavorable employment actions when there is sufficient information available to them that should have, in their minds, raised a suspicion of discrimination. In this case, the Complainant did not inquire into the Respondent's reasons for not hiring him. After the 300- day statutory limit for filing a complaint had expired, he was informed that the job he had applied for had been “targeted for a woman.” The Complainant did not establish a sufficient basis for tolling the 300-day statute of limitations. Young v. Madison Water Util. (LIRC, 01/18/96).

The application of equitable estoppel against the employer is justifiable only where the employer has knowingly been untruthful. When the employer offers a specific, objective factual statement which an unsuccessful job applicant might reasonably rely on to allay their concerns about whether their rejection was for a non-discriminatory reason, it could be considered to equitably estop the employer from reliance on the statute of limitations if it is later proven to be untrue. Sunn v. School Dist. of Poynette (LIRC, 07/24/95), aff’d sub nom. Sunn v. LIRC (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 02/19/96).

Employees have an obligation to exercise reasonable diligence to discover essential information bearing on their claim. If they fail to exercise such reasonable diligence, any ignorance they suffer from is not “excusable” and equitable tolling may not be invoked. However, when an employer volunteers or otherwise provides a reason for the discharge, the situation is different. If a person is already in possession of information which casts doubt on the reason they received from the employer, it may not be reasonable for them to simply sit on their rights in the face of this knowledge. In this case, the Respondent told the Complainant that he was chosen for layoff because he made the most money and because his work performance was not up to par. The Complainant consistently argued that the allegations regarding his work were untrue. Additionally, the fact that a younger man remained employed in the Complainant’s department, coupled with the Respondent’s comments about his salary, would have or should have caused a reasonably prudent person to surmise that the discharge may have been based on the Complainant’s age. Therefore, there was no basis in this case for tolling the statute of limitations. Kniess v. EGA Prod., Inc. (LIRC, 06/23/94).

The Respondent was not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because its attorney incorrectly represented to the Complainant's attorney that the Complainant was required to exhaust internal remedies prior to filing a complaint. The Complainant's attorney’s reliance on the representation made by the Respondent's attorney were not reasonable. Case law establishes that participating in a grievance procedure does not toll the running of the statute of limitations for commencing an action under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. The Complainant’s attorney had an obligation to look up the statute of limitations and determine through independent research whether he was required to follow the Respondent’s internal procedures prior to filing a complaint with the Department. Perri v. DILHR (La Crosse Co. Cir. Ct., 04/25/94).

The two equitable doctrines relevant to the statute of limitations are equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. Equitable tolling is a doctrine that treats the running of the statute of limitations as being suspended for the duration of any period in which the Complainant is excusably ignorant of the employer's discriminatory act. Equitable estoppel, by contrast, is a doctrine that treats the employer as being estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a defense if the employer has misrepresented or concealed facts necessary to support a discrimination charge. The concepts of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling "intertwine" where the Complainant is excusably ignorant of the employer's discrimination because the employer has misrepresented or concealed facts. When an employer gives no reason for an employment action and no reason is apparent from facts already known by the person affected, or when the employer gives a reason which is inconsistent with facts already known by the person affected, the person affected may not later claim some equitable basis for relief from the statute of limitations if they take no steps to learn what the reason for the action was. However, if the employer does give a reason, and if it is not inconsistent with or rendered doubtful by facts already known to the person affected, then the person affected will reasonably rely on this reason given. Their ignorance of an alleged real reason which they subsequently learn of is, in these circumstances, reasonable; it is also inequitable in such circumstances for the employer to raise the statute of limitations as a defense. Sunn v. Sch. Dist. of Poynette (LIRC, 08/17/93).

The statute of limitation will be tolled if the employer makes a misrepresentation of its intent to remedy an unlawful practice. The burden of establishing facts sufficient to justify tolling of the filing period is on the Complainant. Wright v. DOT (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 02/25/93).

An employee who was informed of the termination of his employment on March 19, 1990 was required to file his claim alleging discriminatory discharge within 300 days of the March 19, 1990 date. The employee's attempts, through the employer’s post-termination procedures, to regain his position did not toll the statute of limitations period. Hoefs v. Perlman-Rocque, Whitewater (LIRC, 09/16/92).

Where a Complainant argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because the Respondent did not have informational posters concerning applicable anti-discrimination laws posted at the workplace as required by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Department will analyze the Complainant’s arguments by reference to sec. Ind 88.21, Wis. Adm. Code, which is the posting requirement established by the Equal Rights Division. In this case, the Complainant’s claim for equitable tolling was rejected, even if the Respondent did not post the required posters. The failure to post notices is only considered legally significant if the employee is genuinely ignorant of the illegality of discrimination which the notice, if it had been posted, could have informed him of. Olson v. Lilly Research Lab. (LIRC, 06/25/92). [Ed. note: sec. Ind 88.21, Wis. Adm. Code, has been renumbered sec. DWD 218.23, Wis. Adm. Code.]

There are two related doctrines whereby a Complainant may modify the length of a filing period: equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. Equitable estoppel occurs where an employee is aware of his rights but does not make a timely filing due to his reasonable reliance on his employer’s misleading or confusing representations or conduct. The employer must be shown to have either an improper purpose or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of his conduct. Equitable tolling is premised on a party's excusable ignorance of their statutory rights. It can be found to toll the statute of limitations if the excusable ignorance is caused by the failure of the employer to conspicuously post informational notices required by law. Even where an employer has failed to post, the appropriateness of equitable tolling continues only until the employee receives actual notice or contacts an attorney. The required knowledge of the law is not the details of the statute of limitations or other procedural niceties of the anti-discrimination statutes, but merely of the general fact that discrimination is unlawful. Olson v. Lilly Research Lab. (LIRC, 06/25/92).

A person's hope that an employer will reverse an adverse decision, when that hope has not been induced by statements or actions of the employer, is an inadequate basis on which to find equitable estoppel which would modify the length of the filing period. Olson v. Lilly Research Lab. (LIRC, 06/25/92).

There are circumstance where a Complainant may be allowed to file a complaint of discrimination even though the filing of the complaint occurs beyond the 300-day limitations period. The doctrine of equitable estoppel comes into play if a Respondent takes active steps to prevent the Complainant from suing in time. The doctrine of equitable tolling comes into play where a Complainant, despite due diligence, is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim (i.e., information necessary to decide whether the injury is due to wrongdoing and, if so, wrongdoing by the Respondent). Similarly, equitable tolling may apply when the untimeliness of the complaint was due to errors by the fair employment practice agency. There were no such errors here. The Equal Rights Division investigator issued an Initial Determination making a finding on a constructive discharge claim when that issue had not been raised by the complaint. However, the Complainant was represented by legal counsel within only a few days of the issuance of the Initial Determination. The Complainant's counsel should have noted that, although there was a finding of constructive discharge in the Initial Determination, there was no claim of constructive discharge in the complaint. At the time that the Complainant retained legal counsel, several months still remained before the expiration of the 300-day statutory filing period. Equitable tolling is inappropriate when the Complainant has consulted an attorney during the statutory limitation period. James v. Associated Schools, Inc. (LIRC, 11/27/91).

The Complainant was denied leave to amend the complaint because the amendment was untimely. There was no merit to the Complainant's claim that the statute of limitations should have been tolled because of his alleged disability where the Complainant: (1) was represented by legal counsel and told his counsel of the factual basis for his amendment months before the statute of limitations expired, and (2) filed an unemployment compensation claim and testified at a hearing on that claim well before the statute of limitations on his equal rights claim expired. Wilson v. Coplan's Appliance (LIRC, 10/10/89).

The Complainant's lack of knowledge of the law does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. Gillett v. DHSS (Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 08/24/89).

Where the Complainant received notice of his termination and the complaint was filed 417 days later, the complaint was untimely despite the Complainant's filing of a grievance with the union within the 300-day period. Landrum v. DILHR (Yellow Freight) (Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., 03/06/89).

The filing of a contractual grievance concerning an employment action does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. King v. DHSS (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 08/06/86).

The 300-day filing limit is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. It is a statute of limitations which is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. County of Milwaukee v. LIRC, 113 Wis. 2d 199, 335 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1983).

The 300-day limitation period does not stop running even though a contractual grievance is filed. Hoepner v. DHSS (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 06/30/81).