119.6 Unemployment compensation decisions

[NOTE: See sec. 108.101(1), Stats., for effect of unemployment compensation decisions on other proceedings.]

Unemployment insurance testimony can be admitted into evidence for the purpose of showing that a witness's testimony was consistent or inconsistent to his/her testimony in the Equal Rights Division hearing. See, Vaserman v. Lakeshore Med. Clinic, Ltd. (LIRC, 10/30/15).

Documents/statements submitted to the Unemployment Insurance Division can be admitted into evidence at an Equal Rights hearing to impeach the credibility of a witness. Here, the individual accused of sexual harassment told the Unemployment Insurance Commission that the Complainant quit for family and time constraints, when he knew that the Complainant quit because she believed he had sexually assaulted her at work, and she had never said anything about family or time constraints. See, Rhyner v. Veterinary Med. Servs. (LIRC, 02/25/16).

An Unemployment Insurance determination or decision is not admissible or binding in a proceeding before the Equal Rights Division. Sec. 108.101(1), Stats. Neulreich v. US Bank (LIRC, 04/11/08).

It was not improper for an Administrative Law Judge to refuse to consider documents relating to the Complainant’s application for unemployment benefits, including a determination by the Unemployment Insurance Division of the Department of Workforce Development. Sec. 108.01(1), Stats., provides that findings and determinations under the unemployment insurance benefits law are not admissible or binding in any administrative proceeding not arising under that law. Valdes v. Harley Davidson Motor Co. (LIRC, 10/27/06).

An Administrative Law Judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding from the hearing record a decision in a related Unemployment Insurance (UI) proceeding. Given the different allocations of burdens of proof in these two types of proceedings, and the different statutory schemes under which they are decided, as well as the fact that the two forums are relying upon different record evidence in reaching their decisions, UI decisions should not be given preclusive effect, or even accorded significant weight in cases before the Equal Rights Division. Josellis v. Pace Indus. (LIRC, 08/31/04), aff’d sub nom. Josellis v. LIRC (Sauk Co. Cir. Ct., 09/15/05).

The Complainant stated a claim for which relief could be granted under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act where she alleged that the Respondent discriminated against her with respect to her unemployment compensation benefits because of her age. While an employer cannot determine which employees will ultimately receive unemployment benefits, the act of furnishing disqualifying information to the Department is a matter over which the Respondent does have control. If the Complainant is able to prove that the Respondent selectively supplied the Department with disqualifying information based upon the ages of its workers, then her complaint will have stated a claim under the Act. Baurichter v. Admanco, Inc. (LIRC, 06/26/96).

The Administrative Law Judge erred in relying on the Unemployment Compensation Appeal Tribunal Decision. Sec. 108.101, Stats., clearly has as its purpose the elimination of the practice of using unemployment compensation decisions as preclusive determinations in other forums. Notaro v. Kotecki & Radtke, S.C. (LIRC, 07/14/93).

Where the allocation of burdens of proof differ, it is not appropriate to give collateral estoppel effect in an Equal Rights proceeding to an Unemployment Compensation determination. The fact that an employer did not meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence in an Unemployment Compensation proceeding that an employee did not call in does not necessarily mean that the employee must be considered to have met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he did call in. Moncrief v. Gardner Baking (LIRC, 07/01/92).

Sec. 108.101, Stats., limits the extent to which unemployment compensation determinations can be given preclusive effect in other litigation. The statute became effective with respect to unemployment compensation determinations issued on or after January 7, 1990. Where the statute is applicable, it will effectively displace most of the legal considerations relating to the issue of collateral estoppel in the past. Guel v. Cooper Power Sys. (LIRC, 11/15/91).

[Wis. Stat. Sec 108.01 became effective with respect to unemployment compensation determinations issued on or after January 7, 1990. The following cases related to collateral estoppel are included for historical purposes only.]

Where a Complainant was denied the opportunity to present evidence of discrimination at an unemployment compensation hearing, the ruling in the unemployment compensation matter cannot be res judicata on the discrimination claim. The application of collateral estoppel can be avoided when the party against whom it is sought establishes that he did not have a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to present the claim in the initial proceeding. Rucker v. LIRC (LIRC, 07/16/87); aff’d, Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., 07/07/88; aff’d, (Ct. App., Dist. I, unpublished opinion, 05/15/90).

Where a final decision of the Unemployment Compensation Appeal Tribunal found that an employee quit, but for good cause due to sexual harassment attributable to the employer, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was applied to prevent re-litigation of the findings of fact and law made in the unemployment compensation decision.Carlson v. Three Star (LIRC, 08/27/86).

A discharged Complainant’s successful outcome at an unemployment compensation hearing does not impact on her handicap discrimination charge before the Equal Rights Division because the evidentiary standards are different. Christianson v. LIRC (City of Eau Claire) (Eau Claire Co. Cir. Ct., 03/02/83).

DILHR’s denial of the unemployment compensation claim of an employee with rheumatoid arthritis because she was unavailable for work was not probative of her inability to perform her job duties at the time of her discharge. J. C. Penney v. DILHR (Mitchell) (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 03/22/76).