119.2 Title VII, ADEA, other federal court decisions

A federal district court ruling granting summary judgment had issue preclusion effect on complaint filings with the Equal Rights Division, as they rested on the same allegations as those disposed of in federal district court litigation, and there was no fundamental unfairness by preventing a second hearing on those issues in the Equal Rights Division. Balele v. State of Wisc., Dep't of Corr. (LIRC, 06/13/18).

The Complainant claimed discrimination because of age and disability in both the Equal Rights Division and the EEOC. The investigative unit of the Equal Rights Division put his state complaint in abeyance while he pursued his federal claims in U.S. District Court. The court granted summary judgment against the Complainant, making extensive findings and concluding there was no evidence of age or disability discrimination. The Equal Rights Division then dismissed the state complaint based on the federal court’s dismissal. The Complainant’s allegations were actually litigated in federal court even though disposed of by summary judgment as opposed to an evidentiary trial, and the fundamental fairness analysis of Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, para. 110, favored application of issue preclusion. Puent v. Croell Redi-Mix (LIRC, 08/07/17).

The Complainant had a full opportunity to litigate her claim before the federal district court and to appeal to the federal court of appeals. However, given the unique circumstances of this case, the doctrine of issue preclusion should not have been applied to prevent the Complainant from re-litigating the issue of whether her claim was timely filed in the administrative forum. The Complainant was not represented by legal counsel at the time that she filed her charge with the EEOC. Further, the United States Supreme Court changed the law affecting the timeliness of EEOC charges after the Complainant filed her charge. Fundamental fairness requires that this case be remanded to LIRC with instructions for LIRC to remand the cause to the Equal Rights Division for further proceedings. Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433. (Aldrich II).

The Complainant could not have litigated her Wisconsin Fair Employment Act claims in federal court. The exclusive means of asserting a claim under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act is through the Equal Rights Division. Therefore, the doctrine of claim preclusion did not prevent the Complainant from bringing her claims before the Equal Rights Division. However, where appropriate, the narrower doctrine of issue preclusion (which applies only to issues which were actually litigated and decided in a prior action) will prevent re-litigation of identical issues which have been decided in federal court. Aldrich v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 63, 310 Wis. 2d 796, 751 N.W.2d 866 (03/18/08). (Aldrich I).

The Equal Rights Division does not have the authority to adjudicate claims of violations of federal laws. Therefore, the Complainant’s contention that his failure to be hired was in violation of federal laws was properly dismissed. Bedynek-Stumm v. State of Wis. (LIRC, 02/08/08), aff’d sub nom. Bedynek-Stumm v. LIRC (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 10/10/08).

Subsequent to the filing of the complaint in the Equal Rights Division, a separate decision was issued in a suit filed by the Complainant against the Respondent (a labor union) in federal court, involving the same set of facts. The federal court granted the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find that the Respondent’s decision not to take the Complainant’s grievance to arbitration was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Thus, the issue presented in the Complainant’s Equal Rights complaint was fully litigated and determined by a final judgment of the federal district court. The district court’s judgment precluded re-litigation of the same issues before the Equal Rights Division. Mack v. AFSCME Local 366 (LIRC, 07/24/02), aff’d sub nom. Mack v. LIRC (Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., 03/24/03).

Where a federal court had dismissed the Complainant’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims, such dismissal was res judicata and precluded the Complainant from pursuing retaliation claims against the same Respondent under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act where those claims arose out of the same basic factual situation. Bourque v. Wausau Hosp. Ctr. (LIRC, 04/02/92).

For purposes of res judicata, a basic factual situation generally gives rise to only one cause of action, no matter how many different theories of relief may apply. Neither the details of the claim nor the facts, evidence or theories of recovery need to be identical in order for the former action to bar the latter. Imposing res judicata as a bar to resumption of the Personnel Commission proceedings after an adverse federal decision does no violence to the independent action principles underlying Title VII where all of the elements of the doctrine of res judicata are met, i.e., identity of parties and issues and, most importantly, the opportunity to litigate them in the former proceedings. Schaeffer v. State Pers. Comm’n, 150 Wis. 2d 132, 441 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1989).

LIRC has adopted the “transactional view” of a cause of action, as set forth in DePratt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 306 (1983). The test of whether two suits are based on the same cause of action is whether both suits arise out of the same basic factual situation. Maguire v. Marquette Univ. (LIRC, 08/18/88).

For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, there must be: (1) a judgment on the merits, (2) an identity of parties, and (3) an identity of causes of action. A decision by a federal court dismissing a Complainant’s case on the basis of the pleadings was a judgment on the merits. The Complainant’s argument that she should nevertheless be allowed to pursue her state action on the same claim on “fairness” grounds is unfounded. Fairness to the Respondent is a fundamental basis underlying the doctrine of res judicata. Further, the Supreme Court of the United States has directed that the doctrine of res judicata be strictly enforced. Maguire v. Marquette Univ. (LIRC, 08/18/88).

A federal court judgment in a Title VII action may be given preclusive effect against subsequent claims raised under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. This is true even though Title VII will still be available as a remedy to a litigant even after a state proceeding has been completed. Haynes v. Pressed Steel Tank Co. (LIRC, 05/23/89).

Some of the Complainant's claims were not precluded by the judgment of the federal court in the Complainant’s Title VII action because the claims were not fully litigated in federal court and it was doubtful whether the Complainant would have been allowed to litigate those issues by the trial judge. Haynes v. Pressed Steel Tank Co. (LIRC, 05/23/89).

A federal court decision dismissing a complaint of sex discrimination based on the Court’s conclusion that the complaint itself established that the Complainant was not entitled to a finding of discrimination, was a judgment on the merits, and had res judicata effect as to the Complainant’s claim of sex discrimination against the same employer pending before the Equal Rights Division. Maguire v. Marquette Univ. (LIRC, 08/18/88).

LIRC will not assert jurisdiction over a white employee's complaint that he was discriminated against because of race when his employer complied with a consent decree issued by a Federal District Court requiring that employer to give retroactive seniority to certain minority class members. The complaint constituted an impermissible collateral attack against the consent decree. Wolterstorff v. Milwaukee County (LIRC, 03/29/88).

Where the employee moved for summary judgment on a number of issues on the basis of a special verdict in a federal court action under section 1981 and the employer moved to dismiss on the ground that the federal court had res judicata effect, the Personnel Commission found that the judgment of the federal court had res judicata effect, and dismissed the employee's complaint. Weatherall v. DHSS (Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 10/07/87).

The Complainant litigated her claim under Title VII before the U.S. District Court, lost on the merits, and lost on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Because of the identity of parties and issues, the Personnel Commission held that the Complainant was precluded from relitigating her complaint before the Commission, and Respondent's motion to dismiss on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel was granted. Namenwirth v. UW-Madison (Wis. Pers. Comm'n, 02/13/86).

An individual who has fully litigated a discrimination claim under the ADEA in federal court may not subsequently pursue in a state administrative proceeding remedies which were available in federal court. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co. (LIRC, 08/28/84).

Litigation of a state discrimination claim which has been reviewed by state court may bar subsequent litigation of the same claim under Title VII. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 US 461, 28 FEP Cases 1412 (1982). Parties must be identical before either collateral estoppel or res judicata applies. In this case, LIRC was not a party to the federal action nor in privity. Sanchez v. LIRC (Dane County Cmty. Action Comm.) (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 11/20/80).

The decision reached by a federal court in a Title VII suit is not res judicata in a complaint filed under the Act. The statutes express an intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies and the identity of issues necessary for res judicata is absent when the two laws have not been similarly interpreted. Rubenstein v. LIRC (UW Bd. of Regents) (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 08/15/80).

Although an action involving the same parties and subject matter was dismissed in federal court on an employer's motion, DILHR was not barred by res judicata, by election of remedies or by federal preemption from proceeding to hear the complaint at the state level. State ex. rel. Opportunities Indus. Ctr. v. DILHR (Sharma) (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 11/06/75).