222 Cases

The fact that the Respondent presented no witnesses does not require a finding on the Complainant’s behalf. The Complainant retains the ultimate burden of proof, and in this case the Respondent’s non-discriminatory explanation for barring the Complainant from its facility came in through the Complainant’s own evidence. Young v. State of Wis., Dep't of Workforce Devel., Div. of Employment and Training (LIRC, 01/31/22).

The Complainant failed to establish the Respondent violated the Wisconsin Public Accommodations & Amusements Act because of sexual orientation. He alleged that an employee of the Respondent (Walgreens) told him that the Respondent did not serve "his kind of people." That statement, without more, is insufficient to establish that it was related to the Complainant's sexual orientation. Nothing in the record indicates that the employee knew that the Complainant was homosexual. The prescriptions the Complainant sought to have filled were for insulin and blood pressure medication and would have given no reason for the employee to be aware of the Complainant's sexual orientation. James v. Walgreen Co. (LIRC, 05/31/16) (unavailable online, ERD Case # CR201500511).

The Complainant’s allegation that she was given differential treatment compared to a white male customer in negotiating a transaction at a retail store states a claim under the WFEA’s prohibition against preferential treatment. The Complainant’s comparison of her experience and the experience of a white male customer did not show preferential treatment because of sex or race. Differences in the treatment of the two customers was satisfactorily explained as being motivated by non-discriminatory economic considerations, reducing the idea of racial or sexual bias to speculation. Khan v. Value Village (LIRC, 12/04/14), (appealed to circuit court then selected jury trial).

The Complainants may have found it insulting or demeaning to have been denied entry into a club based upon their looks and manner of dress. However, the Respondent is a limited-access club that maintains a dress code designed to ensure that its clientele reflects a fashionable and trendy image. The evidence established that the Respondent turned away people of all races because of their physical appearance and manner of dress. The Complainants’ position that they were discriminated against based upon their race was also weakened by the fact that they were admitted to the club on two of the three occasions they attempted to gain entry. Pryor v. Decibel Deep Bar (LIRC, 10/28/11).

There was no probable cause to believe that the Complainant was denied service at a service station because of her race. The Complainant, who is African-American, sent her daughter into the service station with her credit card so that the clerk could authorize her to purchase gasoline. The clerk told the Complainant’s daughter that he could not turn on the gas pump because the credit card was not hers. The Complainant entered the service station to speak to the clerk after he cursed at her daughter. When the Complainant questioned the clerk about using foul language in her daughter’s presence, the clerk stated, “I don’t have to take this shit from you, nigga.” The evidence failed to provide reason to believe that the Complainant was denied gasoline service because of her race. The evidence established that she was actually denied gasoline before the clerk’s use of the racial slur, and that other African-American customers did receive gasoline service while the Complainant was at the service station. Bowman v. Citgo Convenience Store (LIRC, 08/25/10).

The Respondent was a van service which was acting as an agent of the county Sheriff’s Department. The Sheriff’s Department contracted with the Respondent to remove and store the Complainant’s personal property after he was evicted and his landlord secured a writ of restitution. The Complainant, as a third party who did not directly attempt to avail himself of the Respondent’s services, did not have the type of relationship with the Respondent that is contemplated by the Public Accommodations and Amusements law. Therefore, there was no basis to find that he was denied the full and equal enjoyment of a public place of accommodation or amusement. Wendt v. Bajet Van Lines (LIRC, 10/06/05).

The Complainant failed to establish that the Respondent, a basketball club, violated the Public Accommodations and Amusements law by not selecting her to continue as a volunteer coach for her daughter’s fifth grade team because of her sex. Sec. 106.52, Stats., protects access to “places.” The right to coach an amateur basketball team is not a “place.” Moreover, a “public place of accommodation or amusement” is a place to which members of the public are normally invited under no condition but the payment of a fixed charge (i.e., there was no selectivity on the part of the proprietor in the admission of members of the public, apart from a requirement that they be able to pay). Here, members of the general public are not invited to be coaches of the teams organized by the Club. In addition, the statute protects a person’s access to services provided by, not a person’s provision of services to, a public place of accommodation or amusement. The intended recipients of the Club’s amusements or services are the children who participate in the basketball training and competition opportunities directed by the coach. As a result, it is irrelevant that the Complainant derives amusement from serving as a coach, because her status as a provider of the Club’s services is not a protected one. Wolff v. Middleton Basketball Club (LIRC, 03/11/05); aff’d. sub nom. Wolff v. LIRC (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 01/03/06).

Where the evidence established that the Complainant was barred from the Respondent’s premises based upon repeated instances of disorderly conduct, and not because of her race, color, age or gender, there was no probable cause to believe that the Respondent had violated the Wisconsin Public Accommodations and Amusements Act. Rhyne v. Mayflower Motel & Lounge (LIRC, 04/16/01).

The Complainant alleged that she was forbidden from playing golf at certain times and was denied access to certain business and networking opportunities solely because she was a woman member of a country club. Her case was not barred by the one-year statute of limitations because the club’s allegedly discriminatory actions constituted continuing violations of the statute resulting from express, openly espoused policies of a continuing nature. Barry v. Maple Bluff Country Club, 221 Wis. 2d 707, 586 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1998).

The Respondents violated the Wisconsin Public Accommodations and Amusements Act by denying the Complainant the full and equal enjoyment of their bar because of disability. Among other things, the Respondents used demeaning language in telling the Complainant, who has a pronounced limp, that he should leave the bar. For example, one of the co-owners of the bar stated, “Crips don’t belong in my bar.” The Complainant did not present medical documentation regarding his condition; however, he was still able to prove a violation of the statute by showing that he was regarded as having a disability. Even if the Respondents had offered accommodations to some disabled individuals, this alone did not defeat the Complainant’s claim that he was denied access to the Respondents’ business because he was regarded as disabled. Perrigoue v. Oregon Bowl (LIRC, 02/25/98).

The Complainant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where she alleged that the Respondents did not allow her to participate in a basketball game after she had won a contest sponsored by the Respondents. The winner of the contest was to be given an opportunity to play in a basketball game with the Harlem Globe Trotters. When the Complainant reported to the game, the Respondents refused to allow her to play due to her sex. The alleged denial of the opportunity to play in the basketball game did not constitute a violation of the public accommodations law because a basketball game is not a “place” of accommodation or amusement. Graser v. WMIL FM 106 (LIRC, 01/17/95).

The Respondent's “ladies drink free” night violated sec. 101.22(9)(a)2, Stats. The reasonable interpretation of sec. 101.22(9)(a)2, Stats., is that it prohibits price differentials or discounts based on the categories specified in the statute. Certain conduct (such as charging a higher than regular price on drinks to only one gender or to only one race) would violate both subdivisions of this statutory provision. Promotions may not involve price differentials or other differential treatment based on the categories covered by the statute, whatever the intent. It was immaterial in this case that the Respondent also offered a “men’s night out” when men received a discount on beer. On the night the Respondent offered free drinks to women it gave preferential treatment to women. Preferential treatment to men on other nights did not correct that violation. Novak v. Madison Motel Ass'n 188 Wis. 2d 407, 525 N.W.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1994). [Ed. note: Sec. 101.22,(9)(a)2, Stats., has been renumbered sec. 106.52(3)(a)2., Stats.]

The Respondent subjected the Complainants to a racially hostile environment, thereby depriving them of the “full and fair enjoyment” of a place of public accommodation when the owner of the restaurant told the Complainants that they could leave after the Complainants had objected to the owner’s use of racially offensive language with other restaurant patrons. Although the remarks were not personally directed at the Complainants, they pertained to the Respondent's negative perceptions of black people in general and were made loudly enough for the Complainants to hear plainly. In essence, although the Complainants were invited by the Respondent to patronize the restaurant, a place of public accommodation, their use of the establishment was made contingent upon their willingness to suffer the offensive comments. Bond v. Michael’s Family Rest. (LIRC, 03/30/94).

The Respondent violated the Public Accommodations Law by offering aerobics classes in which only women are allowed to participate. The fact that the legislature has created an express exception with limited applicability to public toilets, showers, saunas and dressing rooms, precludes the Department from recognizing an exception for aerobics classes. It is in the domain of the Legislature to weigh and decide difficult policy questions such as what the scope of the protected right of privacy should be and what weight one person's rights to privacy should be given as against another person's rights to be free of discrimination. Schmid v. Shape Up Shoppe (LIRC, 01/11/93).

A difference in men's and women's showers and dressing rooms is legally significant if it results in either sex not receiving full and equal enjoyment of the public place of accommodation or amusement. A showing that one sex did not receive full and equal enjoyment of a public place of accommodation or amusement may be made by showing that the facilities of one group are unambiguously better than those of the other, or by demonstrating that the differences were either intended to or did have the effect of discouraging one group's use of the public accommodation or amusement in question. Where the Complainant established only that there were partitions between shower heads and separate changing enclosures in the women's shower and locker room that were absent in the men's shower and locker room, the Complainant failed to show that the women's locker room was unambiguously better than the men's locker room or that the difference either was intended to or did discourage men from using the Respondent's facilities. Malecki v. Vic Tanny Int'l of Wis. (LIRC, 08/07/92).