Skip main navigation

Outdated or Unsupported Browser Detected
DWD's website uses the latest technology. This makes our site faster and easier to use across all devices. Unfortunatley, your browser is out of date and is not supported. An update is not required, but it is strongly recommended to improve your browsing experience. To update Internet Explorer to Microsoft Edge visit their website.

112.3 Standing

A union is an entity which may file a complaint of discrimination under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. This is true even if the record did not establish that the membership of the union had given the union the authority to file the charge. Milwaukee Teachers Educ. Ass’n v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dir. (LIRC, 06/30/10).

A union had standing to file a charge of discrimination. However, by filing an action pursuant to sec. 111.322(1), Stats., the union had the burden of establishing that at least one of its members had been injured. That statute provides a cause of action for acts of discrimination which have already occurred. In this case, at least one individual must have been denied the type of medication which the Respondent declined to cover under its health insurance plan (i.e., Viagra or other erectile dysfunction drugs). The failure by the union to identify any individual who had been denied coverage was fatal to its claim under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act. The union’s reliance on cases filed under sec. 111.322(2), Stats. (which creates a cause of action for statements printed or circulated by the employer which proclaim its present or future intent to discriminate) was misplaced. That section applies to prospective harm. It does not require that an individual has actually been harmed. Milwaukee Teachers Educ. Ass’n v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dir. (LIRC, 06/30/10).

Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. §111.36(1)(c), only females have standing to bring a pregnancy/childbirth under the WFEA. Neither the commission nor the courts have recognized an association discrimination claim under Wis. Stat. §111.36(1)(c). Carerros v. Charter Mfg. (LIRC, 05/07/2010).

Standing is not an issue of any significance when commencing complaints of public accommodations discrimination, because there is no statutory provision which imposes a standing limitation on who may bring complaints. Malecki v. Vic Tanny Int’l of Wis. (LIRC, 08/07/92).

The concept of standing has no place in determining who may file complaints of discrimination with an administrative agency. Standing is, in federal law, a matter of subject matter jurisdiction arising from the case or controversy restriction contained in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. There is no similar case or controversy limitation in the Wisconsin Constitution. Helton v. Wesbar Corp. (LIRC, 03/19/92).

The president of a local union, a male, was a duly authorized representative and had authority to file a complaint and was acting for the Local which was asserting that female employees of the Respondent had been discriminated against by the Respondent because of their sex. The president was not filing the complaint “on behalf of any specific female employee of Respondent.” He was filing the complaint on behalf of the Local. The Local had the right to bring a complaint of discrimination and to do so by its duly authorized representative, its president. Helton v. Wesbar Corp. (LIRC, 03/19/92).

The rules governing standing before an administrative agency are not necessarily the same as the rules governing standing to seek judicial review. The question of standing to initiate and pursue a matter before an administrative agency is entirely dependent on the statutes and rules establishing the scope of that agency's jurisdiction. Metro. Milwaukee Fair Hous. Council v. Goetsch (LIRC, 12/06/91).

Where the Complainant did not score high enough on a competitive examination to be certified for employment, and where the State refused to include the Complainant in the certification under its expanded handicap certification program because it concluded that the Complainant’s vision problems were not severe enough to constitute a handicap, the Complainant lacked standing to attack the vision standards used in the expanded handicap certification program. Wood v. DNR (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 04/15/87).

A union does not have standing with respect to an individual member’s claim for back pay. Wis. Fed’n of Teachers v. Wis. Dep’t of Pers. (Wis. Pers. Comm’n, 04/02/82).

A union has a right to proceed before DILHR to enforce its members’ rights under a collective bargaining agreement when those rights conform to rights under the Act. Gen. Tel. of Wis. v. LIRC (Communication Workers of Am.) (Ct. App., Dist. IV, unpublished opinion, 10/26/81).

A union has standing to bring a complaint under the Act on behalf of one of its members. Hartford Elementary Educ. Ass’n v. Hartford Sch. Dist. (LIRC, 05/14/79).

A union local is a proper party and a person aggrieved within the meaning of Chapter 227, and it has standing to represent the class of all female employees who were denied pregnancy-related disability benefits pursuant to an employer's sickness and accident plan. Sosnowski v. Uniroyal (LIRC, 05/14/79).