127.71 Termination because of sex, generally

While there were few females in the Complainant's department, that fact alone does not warrant an inference that the Complainant was subjected to a discriminatory work environment. Zerzanek v. City of Kenosha (LIRC, 04/27/06).

The Complainant asserted that statistical evidence regarding the number of full-time women in her department provided evidence of gender discrimination. Statistical evidence may constitute some evidence to support a showing of intentional discrimination. However, the Complainant's statistical evidence did not have any probative value due to the absence of any examination of underlying employment decisions and the motives of the decision-makers involved in those decisions. Talley-Ronsholdt v. Marquette Univ. (LIRC 02/13/01).

It was sex discrimination to discharge a female employee where she was offered and accepted privileges from a male supervisor with whom she was having an affair, where the relationship caused a disruption in the workplace of which the supervisors of both individuals were aware, and the male employee was not discharged. Crosby v. Intertractor America Corp. (LIRC, 05/21/93).

A school district failed to establish that a bona fide occupational qualification justified its decision to reduce a male with more seniority to a forty percent position while allowing a female with less seniority to remain full time. The school district’s contention that it was legally required to provide supervision in the girls’ locker and shower rooms and that its concern for the invasion of privacy of female students justified assignment of a female teacher to supervise the girls’ locker and shower rooms was unconvincing. Moore v. Cedar Grove-Belgium Sch. Dist. (LIRC, 04/29/92).

The Respondent had a legitimate basis for terminating a female substitute teacher where she had a pattern of excessive discipline. The female teacher made 47 disciplinary referrals during a 16-month period while two other male substitute teachers together made only 15 disciplinary referrals during that period. Roberge v. Sch. Dist. of Stanley-Boyd (LIRC, 02/05/92).

When an employer penalizes an employee after the termination of a consensual sexual relationship between the employer and the employee, a presumption arises that the employer acted not on the basis of gender, but on the basis of the failed interpersonal relationship. This presumption is rebuttable only if the employee can demonstrate that the employer demanded further sexual relationships before the decision to terminate was made. Podemski v. St. Francis Home (LIRC, 05/11/90).

There was no probable cause to believe that the Respondent discriminated against the Complainant by terminating his employment because of sex where the Complainant had acted in a fashion that led female employees to believe that he was exposing himself to them and where female employees had reported that he made obscene phone calls to them. Hammer v. G.E. Med. Sys. (LIRC, 08/29/89).

The Complainant was not sexually harassed or discharged from her employment because of sex where, despite proof that a manager subjected her to verbal sexual harassment, she was found not to have told management about the harassment before she was discharged and where there was evidence that she was discharged for performance problems. Schoenhofen v. LIRC (Ct. App., Dist IV, unpublished opinion, 01/26/89).

It was sex discrimination for an employer to discharge a female employee because a male employee insisted that he would not continue to work for the employer, as long as the female with whom the male employee had been having a relationship was allowed to work there after their relationship broke up. The discharge decision relied at least in part on the Complainant’s gender, and was thus unlawful. Abbeyland Processing v. LIRC (Ct. App., Dist. III, unpublished opinion, 02/02/87).

A female employee was discriminated against when she was discharged several months earlier than a male employee with whom she was having an affair, where the two employees were equally responsible for the resulting disruption to the employer’s business. Pike v. Pierson-Pelzman Sweetener Supply (LIRC, 01/16/85).

The discharge of a male employee for a rule infraction, for which female employees were only suspended, violated the Act and was based upon a belief that male employees should be held to a higher standard of conduct than females. Evidence that the employer refused to allow the male to transfer to a position where the employer believed females performed more efficiently supported the finding. Rathsack v. Crescent Woolen Mills (LIRC, 09/25/84).

It was sex discrimination to discharge a male because of an alleged anti- nepotism policy, where the employer retained a female who would have been similarly disqualified by such a policy. Scheidel v. Am. Council of the Blind (LIRC, 04/06/82).

A faculty committee’s decision not to recommend tenure for a female professor because of her lack of published materials was not sex discrimination where she did not possess qualifications superior to a male who was tenured, where the only other persons rejected during the period were males and where the committee’s vote was almost evenly split between members of each sex. Rubenstein v. LIRC (UW Bd. of Regents) (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 02/06/81).

It was not discriminatory to discharge a female employee who, in violation of a notice rule, failed to notify the employer that she would not be returning to work. Hamilton v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 611, 288 N.W.2d 857 (1980).

It was not sex discrimination to discharge the male but not the female employee who had become involved in an affair together because, unlike the female, the male caused management to become directly involved in the affair and had a poor work record. Peterson v. Cent. Paving (LIRC, 10/09/79).

Where two female employees violated a work rule by leaving the premises without permission during working hours, their discharge was not the result of sex discrimination. Cariganan v. Schlitz Container (LIRC, 06/22/79).

In a legitimate reduction of staff, minimal reasons such as physical stamina were sufficient to support an employer’s decision to choose the male employee over the female where both were closely matched in terms of competence. Olson v. Community Mem’l Hosp. (DILHR, 07/23/76).

An employer’s discharge of a female because of its aversion to women working in the auto service department was sex discrimination. Yanta v. Montgomery Ward (DILHR, 03/07/72), aff’d, Yanta v. Montgomery Ward, 66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974).