ER Decision Digest - 126.6 Cases

The Complainant argued that the requirement that candidates for the job of principal have five years of experience in the public schools had a disparate impact on Catholics and/or people with religious school experience. The Complainant's evidence of disparate impact consisted solely of a list of private schools in Wisconsin that were in operation during the year 2012, along with a designation as to which of those schools are religious. The Complainant's disparate impact claim failed as he failed to present any evidence with respect to the religious creed of other applicants, and the record contains no statistical evidence, expert or otherwise, to suggest that the requirement of five years of public school experience has the effect of eliminating applicants of any particular creed, including Catholicism, from being selected by the Respondent. Stanke v. Holmen Sch. Dist. (LIRC, 02/13/14), aff'd sub nom. Stanke v. LIRC (St. Croix Co. Cir. Ct., 09/24/14)

The mere fact that the Complainant's discharge occurred shortly after the Complainant requested and was denied a day off for her religious observance is not a sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the discharge was discriminatory. The timing of the discharge could just as easily be explained by the fact that the Complainant's probationary period was about to expire. Felix v. Milwaukee Cnty. Behavioral Health (LIRC, 04/19/11).

The Complainant asserted that the extension of his probationary period by six hours to account for his observance of Yom Kippur was direct evidence of discrimination because of creed. However, the disputed employment action in this case was the Complainant’s discharge, not the extension of his probation period. The Complainant’s probation would have been extended even if Yom Kippur had not been included in the calculation because he missed 194 hours of work for non-religious purposes. Further, the Respondent would have assessed hours taken off by a Christian worker to observe Good Friday in the same manner. Stern v. LIRC (Dane Co. Cir. Ct., 06/05/09).

The Respondent violated the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act when it terminated the Complainant’s employment because he refused to work on Sundays for religious reasons. The Complainant’s work-related problems were also a factor in the Respondent’s decision to discharge him; however, the Complainant would not have been terminated for these work-related problems if his religious observance had not been a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to terminate him. Tolibia Holdings, Inc. v. DILHR (Ct. App., Dist. II, unpublished opinion, 02/15/95).

LIRC found unpersuasive the Complainant’s contention that evidence she offered concerning the dismissal by the Respondent of two other employees proved a pattern and practice of discrimination against Jewish employees. Forman v. Cardinal Stritch College (LIRC, 06/08/92), aff’d, sub nom. Forman v. LIRC (Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., 11/19/93), aff’d (Ct. App., Dist. I, unpublished opinion, 08/15/95).

A Respondent’s failure to recognize the Star of David or identify the flag of Israel may be surprising, as was his ignorance about a kibbutz; however, such lack of knowledge is not affirmative proof of prejudice against members of the Jewish faith. Vaisman v. LIRC (Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., 01/25/93).

The fact that the Complainant’s actions offended the values and standards of the Respondent’s owners, which they saw as part of their Christian religious beliefs, does not mean that they discharged him for a religious reason. The Complainant was terminated for engaging in conduct which would generally be considered unacceptable for entirely secular reasons. Brye v. Brakebush Bros. (LIRC, 01/11/93).

Where the gist of the complaint was that the Respondent discharged the Complainant on the basis of false reports made to the Respondent by others, and where the complaint failed to allege that the false reports concerned, or were motivated by, the Complainant’s religious beliefs, that the Respondent knew or believed that the complaining individuals disliked the Complainant’s religious beliefs, or that the employer itself shared any dislike others may have held for his religious beliefs, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on a theory of religious or creed discrimination. Furthermore, the Complainant expressly stated that he was terminated, not because of his creed, but upon receipt by his employer of anonymous complaints about him. Hallingstad v. A.B. Dick Products (LIRC, 11/05/87).

To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a Jewish job applicant must prove that he applied for an available position for which he was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The Complainant’s case was properly dismissed where he failed to demonstrate his qualifications for the police officer job for which he had applied. Cohen v. City of Madison (LIRC,12/18/81).