Welcome to the website of the Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review Commission. LIRC is an independent administrative agency which decides appeals in cases involving Unemployment  Insurance (UI),  Worker's Compensation (WC), and  Equal Rights (ER). Information available at this website includes:			In Brief -  ER decisions added 8/26 2007 LIRC Statistics now available on line 1st Amendment doesn't bar Catholic school teacher's age discrimination claim - Ct.App.
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May 22, 2008 -- 2007 Statistics, providing information about appeals to and disposition by the commission of cases in calendar year 2007, are now available at this website.

April 17, 2008 -- In a First Amendment free exercise of religion decision issued today, the Court of Appeals has upheld the authority of the Equal Rights Division to adjudicate a complaint by a Catholic school teacher that her discharge was age discrimination.

Wendy Ostlund taught 1^st grade at a Catholic school owned and operated by the La Crosse Catholic Diocese. After her contract was not renewed for the 2002-03 school year, she filed a complaint with the Equal Rights Division alleging age discrimination. The Coulee Catholic Schools Association (CCS), of which the school was a member, sought dismissal of the complaint on grounds that Ostlund’s position was "ministerial" under Jocz v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 273 (Ct.App. 1995) and that adjudication of her complaint would thus infringe CCS' protected First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. CCS also asserted that Ostlund was let go because of a reduced need for staff and because her degree was in physical education, not elementary education, and she was not certified to teach 1^st grade.  An ALJ denied CCS' motion, and on appeal, LIRC affirmed that ruling.  LIRC's decision agreed with the ALJ's reasoning that the question of whether adjudication would interfere with free exercise rights came down to the issue of excessive entanglement and that therefore the inquiry ought to involve not only whether the position was "ministerial", but also whether the inquiry required would be limited or ongoing and whether there was any conflict between the law's prohibitions against discrimination and any religious doctrine of the association. 

On judicial review, the circuit court held that under Jocz the only inquiry was whether the position was ministerial and that it was not permissible to inquire into the nature of Ostlund’s claim or CCS’s response, but the court affirmed the outcome based on agreement with the decision that Ostlund's position was not a "ministerial" one. 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals initially certified the case to the Supreme Court, but the certification was refused. After then considering the case on the merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court to sustain LIRC's denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and to allow its adjudication to go forward.  The Court's decision, Coulee Catholic Schools v. LIRC and Ostlund (No. 2007AP496, April 17, 2008), has been recommended for publication.

Initially, the Court agreed with the circuit court that the applicability of the "ministerial" position exception was the controlling issue, and that LIRC's excessive entanglement analysis based on Sacred Heart Sch. Bd. v. LIRC, 157 Wis. 2d 638 (Ct. App. 1990) was inapposite.  The Court noted that in Sacred Heart there had been no claim that the position was "ministerial".  Turning to the question of whether Ostlund's position was "ministerial", the Court looked to the "primary duties" guide adopted in Jocz, the guidance provided by the 5th Circuit's 1972 McClure decision and the 4th Circuit's1985 Rayburn decision, the 3-part test used in the 5th Circuit's 1999 Starkman decision, and a number of other federal court decisions involving application of the "ministerial" exception in school cases.  Applying the "ministerial" exception in light of that authority, the Court first concluded that the importance of the school to the religious mission of the Church could not be treated as dispositive, noting that "a general exemption for teachers in religious schools would be more expansive than warranted when considered in light of the magnitude of the State’s interest in the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws".  The Court also reasoned that a religious teacher’s duty to model and support particular religious values is not in itself one of the duties included in the "primary duties guide" and does not constitute "teaching or spreading the faith".  It found that this was not a case in which the teaching of secular subjects was so infused with religious doctrine that it would constitute the teaching of the faith.  While Ostlund had religious duties, the Court concluded, they were not her primary duties. Finally, the Court reasoned, not applying the ministerial exception in this case would be consistent with the fundamental purpose of the exception.

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This page was last updated August 26, 2008.